Introduction 55
Cooperative relationships have been widely observed in various taxonomic groups, 56 involving bacteria, reptiles, mammals, and plants (Dugatkin 1997 , Sachs et al. 2004 Melis and Semmann 2010, Raihani et al. 2012) . Previous empirical studies about 58 cooperation have often reported the existence of intra-population variation in 59 cooperation level. For example, yeasts cooperate with neighbouring cells by sharing 60 their profit in the process of resource decomposition, in which morphs with different 61 levels of enzyme production can coexist (Greig and Travisano 2004) . Animals or birds 62 form groups and cooperate in being vigilant to approaching predators, but some 63 individuals vary in their contributions to group vigilance (kangaroos, Carter et al. 2009 ; 64 hyenas, Pangle and Holekamp 2010). In plants, it has been reported that anti-herbivore 65 defence by an individual plant often reduces herbivory on its neighbouring ones 66 (so-called "associational resistance"), but polymorphism of defence level is also 67 observed in some cases (Agrawal et al. 2002, Hare and Elle 2002) . 68
In general, selfish individuals will obtain a higher payoff than cooperative ones 69 because they receive the benefits of cooperation without paying cooperative costs. 70 Therefore, explaining the reason why cooperative individuals can persist in the presence 71 of selfish ones is a challenging and important subject in evolutionary ecology. In order 72 to solve this problem, some mechanisms have been proposed, which include kin 73 selection (Hamilton 1964 (Hamilton , 1972 , future benefits (Clutton-Brock 2002) and frequency 74 dependent selection for the cooperative traits in the context of game theory (Maynard 75 Smith 1982). In particular, because game theory is a useful tool for describing the 76 selection for the traits related to social interactions, game theory has been used for 77 investigating the evolution of cooperation.enzymes in order to produce decomposition products, or in the group vigilance 104 individuals consume time in vigilance in order to detect their predators. In cooperative 105 interactions among multiple individuals, the contributions of neighbouring individuals 106 are aggregated, and consequently each individual obtains a resultant effect as the reward 107 of cooperation. We can consider some types of aggregation process depending on the 108 mechanism of the aggregation. 109
First, we can consider two aggregation stages depending on whether the individuals ' 110 contributions are aggregated at investments or at effects that is produced by such 111 investment. These will only be equivalent if the aggregation is additive and the 112 relationship between investment and effects are linear. However, this is likely to be 113 unrealistic in most cases. For example, the amount of enzyme produced by yeast will 114 not be linearly related the obtained decomposition, because the decomposition rate 115 generally follow Michaelis-Menten kinetics (Zaks and Klibanov 1985) . The detail of the 116 cooperation of yeast should be investigated by considering the chemical 117 reaction-diffusion process (e.g. Borenstein et al. 2013 , Archetti 2014 , Scheuring 2014 . 118
However, for generality of analysis, we summarize those processes into two simple 119 equations, which are ineffective for quantitative predictions but effective for 120 investigation of essential mechanisms in the considered system. One is that each 121 individual produces enzyme z, and the total of this enzyme by all group mates, Σz, is 122 used to produce decomposed products f(Σz), in which aggregation occur before 123 producing products. Alternatively, each individual invests energy z to produce 124 decomposed products f(z), the total of which, Σf(z), benefits the focal individual. In this 125 case, the aggregation occurs after the producing products. We call the former 126 "aggregation of investments" and the latter "aggregation of effects," respectivelythroughout the paper. 128
The second issue is how the factors are associated, i.e., "additive aggregation" or 129 "multiplicative aggregation" (e.g. Σz or Πz). An additive aggregation often applies to 130 material benefits such as enzyme or decomposition products in yeast, but the 131 multiplicative aggregation is also conceivable. Consider group vigilance: if individual 132 bouts of vigilance overlap, the probability of spotting a predator is calculated by the 133 product of the probabilities of a single individual not finding an enemy. This is also a 134 greatly simplified situation, and the group vigilance should be investigated by 135 considering behavioural process in detail (e.g. Proctor et al. 2002) . However, this 136 example shows that multiplicative benefit is more appropriate in some cases. Moreover, 137
we can also consider the difference of reward type, i.e. the reward is obtained through values. In particular, we refer to the trait value and number of i-th morph in the group 171 except for the focal individual as xi and ni (ni≥0 and Σni=N-1), respectively. When the 172 total number of morphs in the population is m, an assemblage of group mates is 173 represented by {(xi, ni)}{i=1...m}, which is an assemblage of (xi, ni) of all morphs. In this 174 group, the payoff of the individual with trait y given the traits of the other group 
(2) 187 Averaging Eq.(1) with this probability, the expected payoff of the focal individual with 188 phenotypic value y is 189 
Evolutionary properties 224
We analysed the evolution of cooperation level using adaptive dynamics theory 225 ( can be written as 232 we investigate how many morphs can potentially appear through evolutionarybranching. In the present study, we refer to this potential as the possibility of 269 "evolutionary polymorphism." Notice that the word "evolutionary" is a key here, 270 because this term suggests the possibility of polymorphism through an evolutionary 271 process. In summary, we say that an evolutionary polymorphism with l morphs is 272
(AE) and additive aggregation of investment (AI) as the examples. In AE type, the 279 payoff of a mutant with y in a monomorphic population with x can be written as 280
According to Eqs. (7) and (8), the singular points x * become CS but non-ES when 282
(10) 283
Since left and right inequalities are never satisfied simultaneously, an evolutionary 284 branching never occurs. Therefore, the condition (i) is never satisfied when l > 1, and 285 we can conclude that the evolutionary polymorphism with two or more morphs is 286 impossible in AE type. On the other hand, in AI type, the payoff function can be written 287 as 288
(11) 289
The singular points x * become CS but non-ES in a monomorphic population when 290
This condition can be satisfied if g(x * ) < f(Nx * ) < 0, therefore we cannon reject thepossibility that the condition (i) with l = 2 can be satisfied. Moreover, we can show that 293 we cannot also reject the possibility of the existence of a solution satisfying the 294 conditions of evolutionary polymorphism with l ≥ 2 (Appendix A). Consequently, in AI 295 type, the evolutionary polymorphism with two or more morphs is potentially possible. 296
We investigated the possibility of evolutionary polymorphism for the other types of 297 aggregation process (MI, pME and sME) by using similar analysis (see Appendix A for 298 the detail of the analysis). with large effects on trait values occur, the population can be polymorphic potentially 307 without the occurrence of evolutionary branching. Such a potential can simply be 308 examined by studying conditions for both feasibility and evolutionary stability of an 309 evolutionarily singular coalition with l morphs, ignoring the property of a singular 310 solution with 1, 2, …, l-1 morphs (see Appendix A). In the present study, we refer to this 311 potential as the possibility of "sustained polymorphism." Note that the word "sustained" 312 is a key here, because we do not a priori assume any mechanisms of how a polymorphic 313 population with l morphs was initially built up. To summarize, we say that a sustained 314 polymorphism with l morphs is possible if (i) a singular coalition can be feasible for 315 states with l morphs, and (ii) this singular coalition can be CS and ES. By definition, ifthe evolutionary polymorphism with l morphs is possible, it automatically suggests that 317 the sustained polymorphism with l morphs is also possible. 318
Here we show the examples of the analysis for the possibility of the sustained 319 polymorphism for AE type and AI type. Please see Appendix A for more details and the 320 analyses for the other types of aggregation. In AE type, the necessary condition for the 321 coexistence of m morphs is that the simultaneous equations 322 for m > 1, two or more morphs cannot coexist; the sustained polymorphism with two or 328 more morphs is impossible in AE. On the other hand, in AI type, we already know that 329 evolutionary branching is possible (see Eq. (12) and Appendix A). Since the 330 evolutionary polymorphism is a sufficient condition for the sustained polymorphism as 331 mentioned above, the sustained polymorphism with two or more morphs is also possible 332 in this case. By using similar analysis, we investigated the sustained polymorphism for 333 the other types of aggregation process (i.e. MI, pME and sME, see Appendix A). 334
It should be noticed that we focused on necessary conditions for evolutionary 335 polymorphism and sustained polymorphism rather than sufficient conditions. These 336 conditions do not ensure that a polymorphism with an appropriate number of morphs 337 always occurs. However, it is surely ensured that when the concerning conditions are 338 violated those phenomena never occur. Our study is thus useful in elucidatingstudies. 341 342
Results 343

Influence of the aggregation process 344
We analytically investigate the possibilities of evolutionary and sustained 345 polymorphism by applying the general approach described above for five types of 346 aggregation process (see Appendix A for details of our analyses) under the condition 347 without any restriction for the functional shapes of the effect f(•) and the cost g(•). Table  348 1 summarizes the result of the analytical investigation. According to the present analysis, Interestingly, in the case of ME, the property is different between whether 362 cooperation is advantage-promoting or it is disadvantage-suppressing. In the sME, 363 monomorphism and dimorphism are possible although polymorphism with more thanhand, for the pME, dimorphism never results from an evolutionary branching, but is 366 sustained. This implies that in such a case, mutations with large effects or migrations 367 from another population are needed to result in dimorphism. We also consider the 368 situation that an individual investment either more or less influences its own reward 369 than those from other members. However, such inequality of the group member's 370 contribution does not alter the general results of our analysis (see Appendix A). 371 372
Influence of the functional shapes of effect and cost 373
The functional shapes also influence the possibility of the evolutionary branching. 374
Next, we examine the influence of their functional shapes on the evolutionary process. 375
To do so, we categorize the functional shapes simply into four types, i.e. linear, convex, 376 concave, and the other functional shapes (e.g. sigmoid), we call the last type as complex 377 type. We examine the condition for evolutionary branching by focusing on AI, MI and 378 sME (see Appendix A) and reveal the combination of the functional shapes of effect and 379 cost that realizes evolutionary branching. Similarly to the above analyses of 380 evolutionary and sustained polymorphism, we consider necessary conditions under 381 which polymorphism occurs. 382 Figure 3 shows the summary of the analysis. In both AI and MI, evolutionary 383 branching can occur only when both effect and cost functions have a decelerating shape 384 at the singular solution. Therefore, both effect and cost functions must be in either a 385 concave or complex shape for the occurrence of branching. On the other hand, in sME, 386 evolutionary branching can occur when either effect or cost function has a decelerating 387 shape at the singular solution, and, therefore, either effect or cost function should be 388 either a concave or a complex type of function for evolutionary branching.
Discussion 391
In the present study, we show that the aggregation process of rewards significantly 392 with various aggregation processes of reward effects. We indicated that polymorphism 404 of cooperation levels never emerges from the evolutionary process unless the 405 aggregation process is AI, MI or sME type. Consequently, we show that the type of 406 aggregation process is an important and remarkable element of cooperation when we 407 consider the variation of cooperation levels. 408
By applying our findings to the empirical examples of cooperation, we can predict 409 the possibility of variation in cooperation levels from the information of aggregation 410 process, or suggest the mechanism of aggregation process itself under an existence of 411 variation of cooperation level. In the cooperation of yeasts, for example, both AI and AE 412 types are possible depending on whether they share the decomposing enzyme or the 413 decomposed products. According to our results, cooperation level becomes alwaysyeasts may share both enzyme and decomposed products probably through the chemical 416 reaction-diffusion process, and our classification of the type of aggregation in yeast is 417 generally difficult to apply to realistic situations directly. However, it is possible to 418 predict from our analysis that some level of enzyme sharing with neighbours is 419 necessary for the coexistence of multiple morphs with different abilities of enzyme 420 production (Greig and Travisano 2004) . In addition, we can also predict that both the 421 amount of decomposed products and the individual cost of producing enzyme should be 422 concave functions of amounts of the total enzyme and the individual enzyme, 423 respectively (see Table 2 ). This prediction is supported by an experimental study ( In order to discuss the effect of the aggregation process in the plant defence, let us 429 consider some simplified situations. For example, one possible situation is the 430 production of toxic chemicals against herbivores which visit plant individuals one by 431 one and feed on them (e.g. grasshoppers or caterpillars). Because toxic chemicals will 432 reduce the activity or survival probability of the feeding herbivores, the production of 433 toxic chemicals will mitigate the herbivory pressure of neighbouring. If the toxic 434 chemicals accumulate in the feeding herbivore and eventually result in the reduction of 435 herbivores' survival probability, the aggregation process is categorized to AI. On the 436 other hand, if the toxic chemicals do not accumulate in the herbivores but reduce their 437 survival probability multiplicatively by each feeding event, the aggregation process will 438 be sME. In these cases, we can predict that in both cases dimorphism of defensivechemical production can emerge. We can also consider other type of associational 440 defence in plants that is against herbivores reproducing on plant individual (e.g. aphids, 441 spider mites or white flies). If the herbivores disperse to the neighbouring plant 442 individuals after the reproduction, the individual defence will reduce the number of 443 spreading herbivores. In this case, the number of herbivores on each plant will be a 444 summation of remaining herbivores and dispersal from neighbours, the aggregation 445 process of which will be categorized to AE, always resulting in monomorphism of 446 defence. 447
In the analysis of the possibility of evolutionary and sustained polymorphism, we 448 assume that the cooperative trait is determined genetically and that it evolves with small 449 mutations. However, in the cooperation based on the flexible decision-making and 450 behavioural action (e.g. group vigilance against enemy), individuals can change their 451 cooperation level discontinuously at any time. In such a case, coexistence of multiple 452 phenotypes can be realized by a mixed strategy with multiple tactics rather than 453 phenotypic polymorphism; hence we cannot apply the presented analysis directly to 454 such behavioural cooperation. However, by an adequate extension of the present 455 analysis, the conditions for sustained polymorphism are applicable to behavioural 456 polymorphism that is controlled by flexible decision-making by individuals (Appendix 457 C). Consequently, we can discuss behavioural cooperation based on the presented 458 results. For example, in the group vigilance for natural enemy, individuals seem to 459 aggregate the probabilities of finding enemies rather than the investment in the vigilance 460 itself, which would correspond to the aggregation of effects. When every group member 461 scans the same area, the probability of no one finding an enemy is the product of the 462 probabilities that each individual fails to find it, which can be categorized to sME. Onthe other hand, when each individual scans a different area, the probability of finding an 464 enemy will be a summation of the probabilities of each finding an enemy, which 465 coincides with AE. Therefore, we can predict that polymorphisms of vigilance level 466 (Carter et al. 2009 , Pangle and Holekamp 2010) will be observed only in the former 467
case. However, we should consider carefully when we apply the present result to the 468 behavioural polymorphisms. Generally speaking, behavioural polymorphism is realized 469 not only by a mixed strategy that is evolutionarily stable, but also by 470 condition-dependent alternative strategies. None of our "impossibility" results rejects 471 the possibility of behavioural polymorphism realized by condition-dependent alternative 472
strategies. 473
In the present analysis, the payoff function is simply formulated as reward minus 474
cost, but another expression may be possible depending on the mechanism of 475 considering cooperation. When we consider the situation that individuals use a 476 common-pool resource cooperatively, consuming the resource of an individual increases 477 its own payoff but reduces the common rewards. In such a case, an individual's cost will 478 be a function of both own and other's investments while its reward will be a function of 479 only its own investment, e.g. f(z)-g(Σz) (Killingback et al. 2010) . Nevertheless by 480 applying a translation , and , we can apply our 481 results to such case, the result of which is consistent with the original result of 482 Killingback et al. (2010) . A payoff can often be expressed as the product of reward and 483 cost, (e.g. f(Σz)g(z) in Brännström and Dieckmann 2005), but we can simply map such 484 cases to our framework by using the log translation of payoff (e.g. log[f(Σz)] -485 log[g(z)
-1 ]). 486
Although we successfully revealed the importance of the aggregation processes on 487 ------AI, MI, sME AI, MI, sME AI, MI, sME sME sME sME sME sME sME sME Figure 3 
